Chaos, Complexity, and Emergency Response Operations
An update of the December 21, 2020, post "Chaos and Complexity Theory: Insights for Managing Emergencies."
Introduction
This essay provides a brief overview of complexity and chaos theory, along with their implications for emergency response operations. Chaos and complexity theory can reshape understandings and approaches to response operations, fostering new levels of awareness, more adaptive practices, and improved strategies for managing fluctuating patterns of order and disorder.
Chaos Theory and Some Insights
Chaos may begin as a system, meaning an interrelated whole that produces qualities at the global level that none of its elements could create on their own (Morin, 1974). Given the right energy and accumulation of disorder, the system can phase transition into chaos, where it loses coherence, and the constitutive elements become unpredictable and unstable, with relationships among them breaking apart as soon as they are formed (Waldrop, 1992). While the system as a coherent whole is lost, patterns may be visible if the elements, such as teams, resources, and individuals, can be observed over a long enough period and from a great enough distance (Waldrop, 1992; Wheatley, 2006). Chaos theory provides a powerful lens and language for describing and explaining an incident or resource when they disintegrate, lose their form, and begin to descend into a state where nothing persists or is stable. Operationally, knowledge of chaos provides a pragmatic set of understandings and descriptions for making sense of all phases of an emergency response. A general knowledge of chaos is of use to managers and resources alike, as it provides an understanding of where one is in the present on the spectrum of order and chaos and suggests what action to take.
Beyond the operational context and back at the resource’s station, chaos can be intentionally used as a method to foster innovation. The literature surrounding the Cynefin Framework, a sense-making framework used to aid decision-making, suggests that intentionally entering chaos can inspire innovation (Kurtz & Snowden, 2003; Snowden & Boone, 2007). A temporary chaotic state is achieved by removing the constraints that typically govern a system, such as a resource (Morin, 1992; Snowden, 2017). This disruption alters relationships, workgroups, and beliefs, moving the system into chaos. An intentional dive into chaos could be facilitated in a discussion-based exercise by forming attendees into new groups, suspending beliefs (what if “x” was not true?), or (what if “y” was not in place?), and proposing long-term transformative goals. In a less abstract setting, a brief intentional movement into chaos could occur during an operations-based exercise by removing central leadership and allowing others to fill the gaps. In either scenario, the goal is to disrupt the system just enough for novelty to emerge, whether it be new knowledge, new approaches, or new relationships (Snowden & Boone, 2007).
From at least one perspective, chaos is a state of total turbulence where nothing forms (Waldrop, 1992). In the context of emergency response operations, chaos might manifest as resources “going rogue” or “freelancing” in the absence of a coherent strategy, and as order breaks down. According to the Cynefin Framework, this is not a desirable state and should be left quickly by establishing order through proposing and implementing a plan (Kurtz & Snowden, 2003). In this way, chaos is understood as something one should swiftly exit once they realize they are in it. While Cynefin suggests leaving chaos expediently, emergency response operations might not always have that option, which is where having a general knowledge of chaos and understanding how it can occur is imperative for responding to and managing emergencies.
Lastly, chaos theory might also be leveraged toward managing responses that cannot easily be moved down the gradient to order. In cases of total turbulence, unpredictability, and unrepeatability, chaos theory indicates that even in the absence of a coherent system, patterns known as attractors may still be visible if enough data can be gathered over a long enough time frame or perhaps if the right set of eyes observes the situation (Capra & Luisi, 2015). While a response might look incoherent over shorter periods, coherence might be found over time even in the absence of a bounded system. Working with chaos temporarily rather than trying to eradicate and establish order may be a significant opportunity for emergency response, as the field finds itself situated on an increasingly dynamic landscape (Phelan, 1999; Wheatley, 2006).
Complexity Theory and Insights
In the words of Morin (1974), “Complexity begins as soon as there is some system, that is, interrelations between various elements in a unit which becomes a complex unit” (one and manifold; p.88). Such a system may be a complex adaptive system (CAS), defined as a system that adapts and evolves in response to changes in its environment and inside itself (Holland, 2014; Waldrop, 1992). A CAS exists on the edge of chaos, embodying a dynamic balance of order and disorder (Morin, 2008). This balance is first expressed in the internal environment, where transitory islands of order emerge amidst a sea of dynamic disorder (Waldrop, 1992). Within their boundaries, everything in a CAS is entangled, meaning that changes in one element produce changes in others. The relationships among the parts are also nonlinear, so changes in one element can lead to disproportionate effects on other distant elements, often long after the initial cause (Cilliers, 1998). Complex adaptive systems continuously evolve as their constitutive elements interact and adapt with one another and the external environment. This evolutionary trajectory is unpredictable in the long term and does not move toward a stable, global optimum, since the relationships among the elements and the elements themselves are always changing (Holland, 1992; Holland, 2014). Complexity theory has various applications in emergency response operations, but two stand out. First, it can be used as a lens for understanding the operations, and second, as a target state for managing and organizing.
Like chaos, understanding complexity is valuable to emergency response operations. While it marks a waypoint on the gradient between order and chaos, complexity also provides new insights into how the field of emergency response perceives itself. Response systems typically exist toward the ordered end of the order-chaos gradient in domains such as “complicated” or “simple” due to decisions made to structure them this way and maintain that structure regardless of the environment (Kurtz & Snowden, 2003). Routine aspects of emergency response should be preserved toward the ordered end, as they do not require innovation or adaptation and provide stability (Donaldson, 2001). For situations that demand quick responses to changing conditions and the discovery of new methods and understandings, CAS is promising.
If key steps are taken, such as using CAS as a basis for training, managing, organizing, and planning ahead of an emergency, it is conceivable that emergency response systems may ultimately benefit from CAS. The role of emergency response managers then becomes understood as more of a hub in a vast network that distributes information and resources rather than as a central authority figure (Capra & Luisi, 2015; Kurtz & Snowden, 2003; Wheatley, 2006). From this perspective, strategy and tactics emerge from the interactions among the elements and their environment, rather than from solely centralized decision-making (Morin & Kern, 1999). Leadership still plays an influential role, intervening when necessary to support desirable emerging patterns and discourage undesirable ones (Kurtz & Snowden, 2003). It is also certain that ongoing movement within the system will occur due to interactions and the balance of order and chaos shifting. This will require an adjustment in expectations, as some degree of disorder will coexist with order. Recognizing that this is not only part of CAS but also a fundamental aspect of any human organization may unlock new potential from both the realms of order and disorder (Morin, 2008).
Suppose emergency response organizations recognize that they can thrive at the boundary of chaos in CAS. In that case, it may become an ideal target state for operations throughout the disaster risk management cycle. The dynamic balance between order and disorder embodied by CAS allows it to innovate and adapt without plunging into chaos or becoming overly constrained by order. In an emergency environment, a CAS can utilize a distributed power structure to respond to emerging needs, new information, and shifting priorities (Cilliers, 1998).
Whether considering emergency response operations or a new effort to enhance community resilience, CAS can provide a theoretical foundation. Central to CAS is the idea that one cannot forecast how a plan of action will unfold over time. Time in this context could be as short as an operational period or as long as a year. Planning from a CAS perspective emphasizes sense-making, includes methods to halt action, and enables continual adaptation. If the plan ceases to be effective, it is adjusted in place. A key element of this approach is that those implementing the plan are empowered to make decisions to modify it over time and incorporate new information. This creates a local feedback loop between action and information, unimpeded by organizational layers (Morin, 2008; Morin & Kern, 1999). By making these and other adjustments and reflecting them in management’s attitudes, a CAS may emerge from a previously ordered system.
Conclusion
Chaos and complexity theories provide emergency response operations with new foundations, language, and perspectives across various practice areas and self-perception. Rather than striving to eliminate disorder, both theories suggest ways to work effectively by balancing order and disorder, and in the case of chaos, overwhelming disorder. They offer insights into the natural states of how entities exist in the world. From these theories, various implications arise that relate to the operational context, emergency response resources, and their interrelationships. Policies, plans, strategies, and tactics can be developed to eschew chaos and embrace complexity as a method of managing, organizing, and observing the environment.
References
Capra, F., & Luisi, P. L. (2015). The systems view of life: A unifying vision. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
Cilliers, P. (1998). Complexity & postmodernism: Understanding complex systems. London: Routledge.
Donaldson, L. (2001). The contingency theory of organization. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications Inc.
Holland, J. H. (1992). Complex adaptive systems. Daedalus, 121(1), 17-30.
Holland, J. H. (2014). Signals and boundaries: Building blocks for complex adaptive systems. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Kurtz, C. F., & Snowden, D. J. (2003). The new dynamics of strategy: Sense-making in a complex and complicated world. IBM Systems Journal, 42(3), 462-483.
Morin, E. (2008). On complexity. (R. Postel, Trans.) Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press.
Morin, E. (1974). Epistemology - complexity. In E. Morin & A. Heath-Carpentier (Ed.), The challenge of complexity: Essays by Edgar Morin (pp. 86–108). Brighton: Sussex Academic Press.
Morin, E. (1992). Method: Toward a study of humankind: the nature of nature (Vol. 1). (B. J.L. Roland, Trans.) New York, NY: Peter Lang.
Morin, E., & Kern, A. B. (1999). Homeland earth: A manifesto for the new millennium. (S. M. Kelly, & R. LaPointe, Trans.) Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press.
Phelan, S. E. (1999). A note on the correspondence between complexity and systems theory. Systemic Practice and Action Research, 237–246.
Snowden, D. J., & Boone, M. E. (2007). A leader’s framework for decision making. Harvard Business Review, 85(11), 68–76.
Waldrop, M. M. (1992). The emerging science at the edge of order and chaos. New York, NY: Touchstone.
Wheatley, M. J. (2006). Leadership and the new science: Discovering order in a chaotic world. San Francisco, California: Berrett-Koehler.