Interaction: A Complex Systems in Operations Story

An Emergency Management Fiction Account of Complex Systems in Operations With Added Insight from Biology and Philosophy. An Experience-Based Approach to Exploring Systems Without Jargon.

Author’s Note: This is the third post in a series focused on emergency response operations known as the “Cassette Series,” with an overarching goal still being considered. This post may or may not become part of any larger goal, such as a book. To be clear, the Cassette Series and some older works are focused on chapter-length posts that provide more exploration than the traditional shorter read post. With that being said, I hope you will read through to the end, as there is information all the way through. This post is the first attempt at emergency management fiction to take complex systems out of the definition-centric weeds and move the subject into a more accessible narrative through emergency management fiction.

Concepts that have already been studied in this blog and new ones will be applied to discuss emergency response operations. “Emergency” is not reserved for fields with lights and sirens responding to medical traumas, wildfire crews working to prevent forest fires from spreading, or search and rescue efforts. It applies to any field where an emergency can occur, meaning a situation where values are at risk; there is limited time to act to protect these values, and there are one or more hazards that add risk and complexity to the response operations to protect them." Alternatively, Morin (1987) writes that when it comes to the word crisis, “Using the term merely allows one to say that something is wrong” (p.231). This definition is also applicable to emergencies.

The aesthetic of this series is essential. Music-related imagery, particularly the cassette tape, will be prominent here. It exemplifies a specific link the author understands between music and writing and an appreciation for old and new cassette culture. This series continues to celebrate finding inspirational music from early cassette culture worldwide. Lastly, this series sincerely recognizes the value and mystery one person can create through limited instruments, including a microphone, a synthesizer, and a few effects, equivalent to one person, a computer, and a couple of shelves of books—greg@gregoryig.com for contact. Use only with permission.

An Operational Coherence Productions Release. Services offered.

Side A

1. Introduction

2. Complexity is (not) in the Head

3. Complexity is in the World

Side B

1. The Emergency

2. Conclusion

Introduction

A post on complex systems was always forthcoming in this series, and if you have been subscribed to GregoryVig for a while, you may have anticipated that. This post delivers a practical, action-oriented look at complex systems by examining their behavior without overburdening the reader with technical terms and notions that are instead used sparingly. The following leans on the work of Edgar Morin, a French philosopher and sociologist, and Humberto Maturana, a Chilean biologist. Morin and Maturana have been essential to this blog and my work, providing inspiration and foundation. This post also relies heavily on distinctions, a primordial operation that underlies and makes everyday life possible. Distinctions, popularized by the work of Spencer-Brown (1994), have been presented by Mingers (1995) as being prelingual and autonomic. An overwhelming majority of the time (so much so it degrades the value of distinction-making), this is true as distinctions are made beneath the level of human awareness driven by a particular motivation, and dividing the world into residual, what does not matter (at the moment), and what does matter due to its value and significance. All distinctions produce some value for the individual that drew them, resulting in an interlocking of distinctions that form the smooth texture of the individual’s world comprised of different entities with varying value and significance.

"Only what is distinguished exists. Although it is distinct from ourselves, we are nevertheless tied to it (Maturana & Poerksen, 2011, p.31).

It is innate and unavoidable to continuously draw distinctions at the autonomic, prelingual, and unintentional levels outside human experience. However, central to this post is the assertion that distinctions and their processes can and should be intentionally moved upward into human experience, rendering them thoughtful, intentional, explicit, and collaborative. Doing so may have considerable value in understanding the surrounding environment and the individual’s “world” and how it came into being. Becoming aware of the human need to draw distinctions and being conscious of them continually may support design processes based on how a group of people constantly divide their surroundings and interactions into important/residual and bring this experience to designers as a foundation for bringing new artifacts into being. One of the earliest distinctions drawn is between whether something is alive/dead, and there is value in drawing this distinction for the observer who now knows how to treat the subject of the distinction, which is essential within the confines of the distinction and its implications for those that follow.

Complexity is (not) in the Head

Rescher (1998) writes, “By and large, the amount of effort that must be expended in describing and understanding the make-up and workings of a system is our best practical indicator of complexity, and its inverse is our best practical indicator of simplicity” (p.17). According to Rescher, the higher the cognitive load involved in describing and understanding a system, the more complex it is. Rescher puts the matter of complexity in the observer's head, the person looking at or analyzing the system. Observers will experience different cognitive loads, so the system's complexity will vary as described. This may happen for other reasons, not only due to the observer’s presence and observation but also how they initially distinguish the system, including its boundaries, actors, and how the actors interact. Operations of distinction contain a double movement of demarcating and bringing something forth, the marked state, as Spencer-Brown (1994) would call it, along with a background in which it makes sense. For the purposes of this post, the background is not necessarily the background from which the entity came. While a physical visual setting might be the most natural set of conditions for a distinction to be understood, in Maturana and Poerksen (2011) and Maturana and Verden-Zöller (2008), Maturana suggests the background or context the distinguished makes sense in can also be narrative.

“And what do we do as human beings operating as observers in observing? We make distinctions. We make distinctions of objects, of notions, of ideas, of concepts...of entities that we bring forth with our operations of distinction together with the domains of existence in which they arise” (Maturana, 2005, p.57).

The quote from Rescher (1998) suggests complexity is a matter of what goes on in the head. However, the fact that mental effort is being exerted to describe and understand a system external to it should not be disregarded. There is something outside of the observer’s head requiring cognitive exertion. Morin (2006) addresses complexity in a similar way as to Rescher, but from an added emotional perspective: “What do we call complex? We call complex something that is confused, incomprehensible, uncertain; so uncertain that we cannot define it” (p.320). Furthermore, Morin (1974 ) writes, "Complexity is apparent as ambiguity and paradox (p.91).”

From the above, complexity is understood as a matter of mental exertion and emotions about something external to the observer. Morin (1974) provides a counterpoint, explaining, "Complexity begins as soon as there is some system, that is interrelations between various elements in a unit which becomes a complex unit” (one and manifold; p.88). At this point, Morin grants complexity ontological status, meaning it exists in the world. Attaching the above mental and emotional factors to complexity, understood as a phenomenon that exists in the world, may be prudent to serve as a signifier indicating when complexity is present. However, an overreliance on mental and emotional indicators rather than determining the presence of interrelations among elements that form a system that triggers the mental and emotional may make distinguishing complexity and complex systems error-prone.

Complexity is in the World

Moving past complexity as puzzlement or mental difficulty is complexity as it is found in the world, a narrative that Morin (1974) started earlier. Much of the discussion below focuses on how complex systems are distinguished as they exist in the world. A few quotes, primarily from Maturana, will guide the following.

It is important to note that although that which is distinguished is separate from the observer, it remains tied to them, even when that which can be distinguished can no longer be seen. The distinctions an observer draws become part of their world; in this way, they continue to be connected to them as a facet of their worldly experience they can recall and reflect upon. Observers define what is in their world through distinctions and ways to become knowledgeable of their content.

"Experience is that which we distinguish as happening to us" (Maturana, 2005, p.57)

For example, the distinguished experience of an emergency involving consistent, intense rain involving mass land movements into a perpetually swelling river, causing flooding that threatens homes and roadways on one side of town; on the other, runoff slides into homeowners’ backyards while high winds cause tree damage. In this case, the background could have included visually apprehending the forest fire that burned with severity along the canyon walls lining the town weeks prior. This led to hydrophobic soil and unstable land mass on the steep slopes, currently animated by torrential rain. This background makes the distinguished sloughing off of the canyon walls understandable and helps others grasp the current state and the threat the amount of precipitation poses to the unstable soil and community. For those who have not witnessed the arrival of the conditions making an emergency probable, a narrative may provide the emergency with valuable background.

Emergency or fire managers may inform an elected official that preceding the emergency, the recent forest fire that affected the community burned with extreme intensity, leaving behind severely damaged, hydrophobic soil on the steep canyon walls that lined the town. The damaged soil could not absorb the several-day ongoing torrential rains, causing mass land movements. An area of concern was the river, where the displacement of runoff was causing flooding that was made worse by relentless rain. A mix of ash and soil crashes repeatedly into the river and properties below. In this instance, the emergency, a term which "merely allows one to say that something is wrong” (Morin, 1987, p.231), distinguished by the elected official involving flooding and land movements, makes sense within the narrative in which it now appears of the forest fire and damaged soil. Drawing a distinction, as described by Spencer-Brown (1994), indicates that a specific motivation drives each distinction. In the above, the motivation was to explain the emergency, which was distinguished with a temporal aspect, including its genesis of the forest fire and the hazards and risks involved in the current state of the emergency. The value of drawing the distinction was shared situational awareness with key decision-makers.

The Emergency

Complexity may first be distinguished by observations and experiences, including the system’s elements from which it emerges, constraints, including a boundary, objects such as people and technologies, the surrounding environment, and interactions among all six. The complexity of a complex system may be observable throughout the emergency response from varying vantage points. For example, a division supervisor encounters a group of nine responders assigned to one task force in a group that also includes one heavy equipment boss. The task force was presently elsewhere on a bridge focused on a heavy equipment boss directing two excavators with corresponding dump trucks to remove large amounts of material that had slid down the steep slope and into the river, affecting the dynamics of the already swelling water. The remaining nine responders, all from different resources, were assigned to this division to work under the task force. Initially, the plan was for the task force to assess the risk the river posed to the homes. However, the task force had never assessed their rush to remove runoff from the river and mitigate flood risk with machinery. Yet, the task force was local and confident, and the responders from area resources knew the area, and the task force planned to stay in radio contact. This was communicated to the responders. Promptly, two responders from the group separated and quickly assessed the need for sandbagging along a low-lying section of homes. One of the responders communicated with the task force over the radio. The responder informed the task force, who could not see their location, that approximately ten homes needed sandbagging.

After a moment, the task force replied, complimented the initiative, and gave the go-ahead. The task force recommended that if they could not communicate with them for any reason or had needs for supplies, they could communicate directly with the division supervisor. The task force also directed them not to travel upriver past Lashley Street, the division break, or beyond Still River behind their position, as it was communicated earlier that streets were flooded and homes were already lost in that area. The group was directed to take any action necessary to save homes, including recruiting more responders who were not committed to a task but to abandon the effort if it became unsafe or ineffective. The task force had unknowingly established a mix of constraints that limit liberties and those that promote them, which are conditions conducive to the emergence of a complex system. For example, the constraint of bypassing the task force for any needs and taking any action necessary to save homes promoted liberty by enabling the group to take action. On the other hand, the constraints of not going past the division break or beyond Still River limited their liberties, as did the direction to abandon the effort if it was becoming unsafe or the strategy was ineffective (Morin, 1992). There is an interplay of closing off possibilities and opening possibilities up established through constraints. If the closing off is not oppressive, and the opening is not overly vague, dynamic behavior can occur within the constraints, and a complex system may emerge (credit to this idea is attributed to Dave Snowden). While, in this case, the constraints were designed, they may occur naturally as features within a complex system’s surrounding environment and support its emergence. Morin’s (1974) earlier description of a complex system and the appearance of complexity does not involve constraints, though his later work does.

The constraints which inhibit enzymes, genes, even cells do not diminish liberty inexistent this level, liberty emerging only at a level of individual complexity where there are possibilities of choice; they inhibit qualities, possibilities of action or of expression. It is only at the level of individuals having possibilities of choice, of decision and of complex development that constraints can be destructive of liberty, that is to say become oppressive (Morin, 1992, p.111)

Unlike Snowden and Juarrero, Morin does not overtly offer an inverse to constraints that can constrain liberty, at least not by name. Instead, he explains,

“We will see that the development of organization does not necessarily mean increase of constraints; we will even see that the progress of organizational complexity is founded on the "liberties" of the individuals constituting the system” (p.110).

Tucked into the prior is the idea that organizational complexity arises through the liberties the system’s actors can take.

To an informed observer, conditions from which a complex system can emerge have just been established. To anyone else, it was a management approach that fit the context of managing from afar, though the directions were unusually truncated. As the two responders returned to the group, a truck arrived in the pouring rain at the location of the first at-risk home. One of the other responders had communicated with the division supervisor who had been close by about the urgent need for sandbags, which was promptly filled. A fourth responder assessed the ground alongside the house and informed the group it was too saturated to drive the truck on as it would risk getting stuck. Someone else in the group directed the driver to back up the edge of the lawn, and someone in the group suggested to “zipper” the sandbags into place over “chaining out” to avoid turning with weight. The responders began emptying the truck of its contents and moving the sandbags into place.

As the work carried on, some hallmarks of complex systems became clear. Authority had become distributed due to the evenness of the qualifications of the responders in the group, and patterns of interaction within the group were becoming numerous, varying in intensity and reoccurrence, involving all the responders, the truck driver, and the division supervisor and task force, creating a dynamic entanglement where all actors are integrated through their interrelationships (Morin,1974). The actors were operating within the constraints handed down to them, and the group had established a boundary around itself through its actions. The boundary encompassed all actors involved, even if they were only loosely connected to everyone else (Maturana, 2008). Interrelationships formed by patterns of interaction may shift subtly or considerably as the context in which they are working changes. The system organizes independently to form patterns appropriate for conditions inside and outside the system. A single responder walks the row of homes until they get to Lashley Street and down to Still River and determines there will be time to finish sandbagging before conditions deteriorate but recognizes at least twice the amount of sandbags will be needed to finish and preemptively orders more from the division supervisor. Meanwhile, another responder took a chainsaw and chaps off a nearby agency pickup truck and began clearing the access route to the next home blocked by a large downed tree from the wind. They are joined shortly by another to help clear away the cut material.

The division supervisor approached the sandbagging operation and observed responders interacting in various ways, trading places, and carrying out different tasks. Shortly, the task force asked no one in particular for an update. One of the two responders who heard their radio traffic while finishing sandbagging behind the home protected from the sound of the chainsaw replied that they only had two houses to go. The task force replied that if the work was completed and they had hit the division break and there was nothing left to secure behind them, they should contact the division supervisor about the group being reassigned.

The raindrops exploded upon impact on the division supervisor's windshield to be immediately wiped away. They had been watching the group finish the last three houses and listening to their radio communications with the truck driver and task force. It became clear that no single person was in charge; there was no central authority. The division supervisor did not yet know about constraints but recognized the resources were following the task force’s earlier direction in the form of what to do and what not to do. However, the task force could not directly serve as the group’s superior due to their involvement in removing runoff to lower the water. Instead, decisions were made collectively or deferred to whoever was closest to the subject of the conversation. There was no hierarchy or established line of order among the responders. The group moved amorphously, filling gaps as needed or varying their behavior as responders left to patrol from Still River to the division break or address a fallen tree. The responders were all connected. Relationships among them went everywhere, connecting them through intense, rich, and recurring interactions. A fabric had emerged, interweaving all the involved actors together. The responders were interwoven tightly, while the truck driver, division, and task force were intertwined loosely as their interactions were less frequent and intense but still vital to the fabric.

Sitting in their truck wearing saturated rain gear but warm, motivated by curiosity, the division supervisor was unfamiliar with seeing this variety of group or team dynamics but found it highly effective. Their observation led to the slow forming of a distinction, a workgroup with a flat structure, free of designed organization, no chain of command, open channels of communication, interchanging roles, highly sensitive to the environment, autonomous, cooperative, and distributed authority within the group but accepting the authority exercised over them by the task force or division. Everything else was residual in this distinction as the workgroup in the marked state seemed significant to the division supervisor. Not having the vocabulary of complexity, the division supervisor referred to the responder group as independent, autonomous, collaborative, and effective. Had the division supervisor possessed the appropriate language, they would have distinguished a complex system that did not need to be disturbed at the moment. Many more characteristics define a complex system, as Cilliers (1998) has made available, but what has been observed is sufficient.

To the division supervisor, there was something more they could not describe - the way the responders interacted, generally face to face, but sometimes responders would leave the group in pairs or individually while remaining in contact through radio. The interaction pathways were puzzling; they were virtual or physical, went above, around, below, between, and interfaced with other pathways. Upon closer inspection, the fabric formed among the group was not comprised of threads running top to bottom, as was the norm. Threads ran every which way, braiding together, splitting apart, and darting off in another direction. The only limits to the size of the fabric the group could weave were the directions handed down earlier by the task force. While looking closely at the fabric, the division supervisor found it hard to describe or explain what was happening, a hallmark reaction to complexity (Morin, 2002). However, from a macro view, patterns were visible. Unaware of the concept of emergence, this perplexed the division supervisor. From one complex systems perspective inspired by Cilliers (1988), this dynamic entanglement of interaction pathways of varying richness, frequency, and intensity found in the fabric of the group and their coherent movements may also be seen as a source of a system’s complexity. It cannot be pulled apart, reduced, and analyzed. Instead, it must be observed as pathways wiggle, tunnel, loop around, thread between, stretch, form, dissolve, and form patterns while change occurs at varying velocities.

The division supervisor searched for an appropriate background to make the unique, distinguished group make sense. The background of sandbagging along the river did not offer any clues, as this method of working and group structure were unrelated to the task. The most paramilitary-structured team could have also performed the very same work.

The entity that is distinguished emerges together with some background in which the distinction makes sense; it brings forth the domain in which it exists (Maturana & Poerksen, 2011, p.32)

However, the military-styled group may have been less adaptive as they cannot produce new patterns of activity necessary to complete work due to culturally important centralized authority structures. A vital feature of a paramilitary organization is the presence of hierarchy binding the responders together in a vertical array of diminishing authority and agency as the ladder is descended. The paramilitary organization was far from the division supervisor’s observations of a group where authority is distributed, enabling responders to regularly assess their division, problem-solve, and react to changing conditions. While authority is distributed among the group members, direction was still received from the division supervisor and task force when given. Still, the group was left to determine how to actualize it best.

It suddenly struck the division supervisor that the group and all the unique characteristics they had distinguished were a departure from the traditional and culturally ingrained norm of order and authority and must be condemned. The division formed a narrative background to make the distinguished group’s dynamics make sense as a deviation. The absence of the task force must have allowed for the deviation as no one was at the top of the hierarchy to stop it. All the responders were of equal qualifications, so they became collaborative instead of ordered. Had the task force concluded their work or handed it off, they could have managed the group using observation, linear approaches to work, and direct authority rather than using limitations (constraints, in complexity language). The division supervisor re-distinguished the group as a mutation that followed a path away from traditional modes of working and being managed. The group was a threat to the establishment of emergency response operations.

The division supervisor grabbed their hard hat and headed out into the rain. They approached the group, now standing on the pavement, having completed the sandbagging task. "We should do a quick After-Action Review; I would like to focus on your perceptions of how you identified and completed that task," the division supervisor said. With the division supervisor’s overwhelming negative distinction of the group, they anticipated negative feedback. As the floodgates opened on the After-Action Review, the feedback from the observed unique group was shared. There were several meaningful and surprising comments: "The task force was preoccupied and could not be pulled away, and a few of us who have lived here a long time knew this division, this area, was susceptible to flooding, so we decided to be proactive." Another responder offered, "The group and everyone in it could act and contribute. We already knew what needed to be done. Each group member had their own skill set, from tree cutting to estimating how conditions would worsen ahead of us relative to our sandbagging speed and how our work was holding up behind us.” Another offered, "It was the ideal situation. The group was not allowed to pass the division break and Still River Road behind us; otherwise, we were allowed to take whatever action we needed to to get it done until we hit the limit of it being unsafe or ineffective, which we constantly watched for. Although a simple task, we tried different methods in the space afforded to us for getting sandbags from the truck to the back of the home. We also took turns scouting, occasionally leading to temporarily skipping a house to meet a more immediate need, such as a more low-lying home, and then circling back around. We were enabled to act as humans do, which made us happier, more effective, and adaptable and enabled us to learn. No one ever took an authoritative position because we did not need it."

The last bit rang in the division supervisor's ears, who had walked over, ready to hear tales of disorganization and searching for leadership and then chastise the group for their free form and decentralized approach and question why they did not request another task force to manage the group or the division supervisor themselves. However, condemning their behavior seemed out of place when the responders felt proud, pleased, and effective. At this point, the task force joined the group to congratulate them on the impeccable work done quickly. The division supervisor considered this additional feedback. For a while, they remained stuck pondering the comment about being able to act like humans and all the benefits this brought along with it.

The division supervisor had distinguished the group as a mutation, but the narrative they used as a background to make sense of the mutation was negative. The group and their new way of completing a task had departed from the traditional, historic, and culturally valued way of working through hierarchies and unilateral decision-making using regulation, direct control, and information to bolster authority. The division supervisor was still reacting to the comment regarding being able to act like a human and the other feedback. As they pondered this comment, the thought slowly crept into the division supervisor's mind that beyond how they had learned how things work over their twenty-year career, they could find no fault in what had happened beyond it being an abnormality, and maybe even still a mutation, but a positive one. The division supervisor was once again curious about the group and given the feedback from the After-Action Review, they pondered it further.

Again, had the division supervisor had the language, they would have realized that this mutation had moved from the group from the ordered domain of the Incident Command System into the complex domain and established itself as a complex system with its own complexity and growth potential. However, this language was unavailable, so it remained a "group." The division supervisor remained curious and thought if the group’s unusual behavior could be repeated, it would be exciting and prove that it was not an isolated occurrence. The group walked for a while, moving into a new part of the division on Beacon Street where soil and ash runoff and downed trees from high winds had made a main road impassible. Upon arriving at the intersection of Beacon Street, the division supervisor approached the task force and explained his observations and suspicion that a particular mutation of traditional organization and working methods had occurred. The task force was distinguished as a critical element of this mutation.

The division supervisor had made the educated guess that the task force's management style was one of the driving factors in the group dynamics. The Department of Public Works was already committed to the division with fifteen people, shoveling runoff and running a few chainsaws, cutting a dozen downed trees to be cleared. The task force and the division supervisor planned to see if they could replicate the earlier sandbagging dynamics, this time with a larger group of unfamiliar individuals, by following the same strategy of limiting activity and defining the space where the group could take any action needed. Operating off a hunch, the division supervisor retreated to their vehicle to observe and left the task force to deliver the briefing to the combined group.

The task force first limited the group's activity to the division break at the end of Beacon Street. They communicated that there were plenty of chainsaws, chaps, and hearing and eye protection, but running the chainsaw was limited to those with experience. However, the task force explained that anyone could assist the chainsaw operator with removing the cut material. The task force drew focus to the other task and explained that a front-end loader was available to shovel runoff into it, and then it would fill the back of a dump truck and that this could be completed in whatever way works best. Then, the task force explained that the entire division would escape to Lashley Street if the weather worsened or other trees came down. Lastly, it was stated that the operation would be stopped if safety issues arose, such as chap strikes with a chainsaw or unexpected downed tree movements. The task force ended the briefing by pointing out that within the limitations of this operation, there was plenty of room to act safely and effectively and asked if there were any questions. A hand shot up from the earlier group, "Some great work has been done here with stacking the rounds at the edge of homeowner's lawns. I think there might be an opportunity to leave this street closer to how it was if we can get one or two chippers in here with trucks," the responder said. The task force, slightly impressed, considered how chipping would button up this division and replied, "I think that is a good idea; I will contact the division supervisor and see what we can get. In the meantime, work on bucking these trees and clearing the street." Everyone dispersed, and the original group fell in with the Department of Public Works according to their skill set.

As the street sprang to life, the Task Force walked to the division supervisor's truck and informed them of the chipper request. This initiative also impressed the division supervisor, who knew of some privately owned chippers as the Department of Public Works chipper was down for maintenance. The division supervisor said they would make some calls and find the equipment. The task force returned to the division and stood at the end of the street under a slight canopy to observe. In their absence, the two groups had started working together in various ways; one of the original group members was assisting the Department of Public Works with a tree by cutting off all the limb weight as they cut rounds out of the tree to avoid binds, or providing a second or third set of hands in the removal of pieces of the cut tree, pounding wedges for chainsaw operators, or working with front loader operator to take as much runoff as possible before committing to shoveling.

The groups had become integrated and formed interaction pathways as required by the goals they were pursuing and the problems they were solving. There was considerable communication through face-to-face interactions, but radio traffic was seldom. The varying behavior of the interacting individuals appeared, even from a distance, to be altruistic and unselfish. They worked cohesively to support one another and efficiently clear the division of debris. For example, when a Department of Public Works chainsaw ran out of gas, one of the original group members who happened to be closer to the combination bar oil and fuel container brought it over and helped them refill.

The task force returned to the division supervisor's truck and informed them of their observations about how the group came together. Once again, providing constraints that limit behaviors and constraints that allow for behaviors to offer space for activity proved effective (Morin, 1992). Constraints replace specific, detailed directions and a central authority figure continually intervening in responders’ work. In the absence of the latter, surprising and coherent behavior may quickly appear. Moving back in the direction of distinctions:

"Thus, if I say, “a table is that entity that arises as I put a plate upon it”…I am showing the operational condition that bring[s] forth a table being aware that the table is not a table by itself. 

Once I have done that and I have brought forth the table, tableness…(Maturana, 2005, p.58).

The above from Maturana (2005) introduces another act involved in operations of distinction, although it appears external to the operation itself, possibly as something that happens later. In the above, Maturana is curious about the operational conditions that make a distinguished entity arise and bring forth its essence. There is an element within the quote that the operational condition of the plate is concerned with proving the existence of the plate: “The table is not a table by itself.” This regretfully simple example hints that complex systems arise through elements such as constraints and are proven through conditions such as specific interactions, which bring forth the essence or dynamics of a system.

In the example of putting the plate on the table, causing the table to arise, the task force's management style was the first operational condition involved in causing the group and its unique behavior to appear. The division supervisor had another "plate" to put down on the group to see if it continued to arise and establish and bring forth its unique "groupness." This plate was the unexpected arrival of the woodchippers.

Approaching from the division supervisor and task force's right came two chippers and trucks. They paused at the intersection and called the division supervisor to confirm the plan, and they drove down the street and parked in the two different spots envisioned earlier. The division supervisor and the task force leaned forward in their seats, anxiously waiting to see what would happen as two chippers entered the division. Except for those actively operating a chainsaw or loading the front loader, heads turned to acknowledge the presence of the solution to the trees cut into manageable round pieces.

The division supervisor invited the task force into their truck and explained that they planned to direct the two incoming wood chippers and trucks to park alongside the right side of the road. One was to park at the beginning of the road where the rounds from previously cut trees had been stacked, and another to park at the beginning where that original strategy had been discontinued, and trees were cut into manageable pieces and left in an orderly fashion on the pavement. The division supervisor's plan was for neither manager to say anything. Instead, the combined group was enabled to exercise its own decision-making and the authority distributed throughout the group due to the evenness of qualifications of its members to develop a strategy for chipping. For some time, there would be three concurrent tasks taking place. Had the task force and the division had the language, they both would have referred to the intention of the operational condition of the wood chippers as a means to determine if the group's behavior would persist. Both might have asked, “Would the group adapt and self-organize around the presence of the new machinery and its purpose and continue its unique behavior by rising to a higher level of complexity through self-organizing into richer and more dynamic patterns?” In place of complexity jargon, phrases like "The randomness of the arrival of the wood chippers will test the durability of this new way of working," said the division supervisor. The task force agreed and added, "The chippers are outside the initial limitations (constraints) delivered during the briefing and the operational space they provide. It will be exciting and valuable to see if they use the same strategy of defining the limitations of chipper use."

An immediate wave of self-recognition crashed over the division as the chippers parked. Without intervention from leadership and hardly any communication, those who recognized themselves as somewhat auxiliary to the task they were involved in departed and divided into even-sized groups assigned to each chipper. "Amazing," said the division supervisor. They continued, "Without any direction from management, the group’s actions aligned with the objectives and did not detract from other tasks any more than necessary than needed to start another." If the division supervisor and the task force had been familiar with complex system behavior, this self-organization to a higher degree of complexity and toward a new task enabled by distributed authority, resulting in autonomy within a structure of limitations and freedoms, the group behavior would not have been surprising. If managed correctly, complex systems, such as the earlier group and the combined one working now, can pursue many more possibilities of action than they could ever actualize all at once (Cilliers, 1998).

In each woodchipper truck, there were two individuals from the company. The group members gathered around each truck and received a safety briefing. One of the individuals instructed, "No watches, no long sleeves, eye and hearing protection at all times; if a log is too big, we can cut it. Most importantly, stay in control and keep it slow and even." Perhaps it was a matter of the overall simplicity of chipping, the terse language of the briefer, or some unbelievable coincidence, but the safety briefing delivered both types of constraints. The group had just successfully added to the constraint structure they would operate within. Almost in perfect unison, both wood chippers turned on. The original group showed the Department of Public Works members the zipper method they had used earlier to move sandbags, which they found efficient and less physically demanding. The division was alive with three tasks: runoff removal, tree cutting, and chipping.

The task force and division supervisor were accustomed to rigid applications of the Incident Command System and believed in its purpose and function. Hierarchy, command, and control were part of who they were. However, after repeat observations, operations of distinction, and the use of operational conditions, both found the leaderless behavior they distinguished unfolding in front of them perplexing yet mysteriously and entirely effective. Under normal circumstances, the three tasks may have occurred in sequence, not in parallel as they are now. The group was distinguished as highly constructive, durable, and a departure from tradition, yet they efficiently handled randomness and thrived through collaboration. An unrecognized early sketch of a complex system, the leadership was beginning to recognize something unique and powerful. The background that was brought forth was a narrative describing the group’s evolution throughout the day that made the group and all of its constructive deviance make sense. In the distance, the first woodchipper advanced down the street, and the rounds stacked earlier were processed. The second machine was fed pieces of trees cut up and left on the pavement. As individuals finished their tasks or were no longer needed, they converged upon the chipping and helped to make it move along more efficiently. The entire division was clear within two hours, and all tasks were complete. Across both divisions, neither the division supervisor nor the task force had hardly uttered a word.

Conclusion

The above seeks to compel the reader to associate complexity less with a state of mind such as confusion, bewilderment, or an increased cognitive effort to understand, describe, and explain and more with a phenomenon that exists in the world. Regarding Maturana's operations of distinctions, a complex system only exists once it has been distinguished: "If nobody makes this distinction then the material or conceptual entity that is specified and demarcated from its environment in this way does not exist" (Maturana & Poerksen, 2011, p. 31). Maturana takes an extreme view toward observing a complex system by making an operation of distinction a prerequisite for being able to observe one. In Maturana's network of ideas, a complex system only exists once distinguished and does not pre-exist this operation.

Once an individual distinguishes a complex system, over time, it may be experienced as an entity separate from their functioning, and they may forget they were the ones who brought a system into their world that did not pre-exist their activity. Maturana (2005) explains that it is vital that an individual who begins to handle objects, notions, concepts, experiences, and even systems as if they exist independently of them do so with the awareness of the operation they performed first to bring it into existence. In Maturana and Poerksen (2011), Maturana describes the necessity of seeing an entity such as a complex system that someone distinguishes not as separate but connected to them. It is transforming separation into the experience of connectedness. While the individual who distinguished the complex system (such as the division supervisor and task force at varying times) is not part of it, they are the ones who performed the operation of distinction, brought it into existence, and then described it. Across two publications, Maturana suggests addressing the perception that something distinguished exists independently from the person who distinguished it by being aware of their connection to it.

"So, although the entity distinguished and the domain of operational coherences in which it exists as it arises in the distinction of the observer do not pre-exist to its distinction, the observer can speak as if both the entity distinguished and its domain of existence existed independently of what they do, as long as he or she does not lose his or her awareness of the fact that the entity that he or she has distinguished, as well as its domain of existence, exist in an operational domain that arises through his or her operations of distinction" (Maturana, 2005, p.58).

There is a more palatable approach to distinctions that involves less grappling with the source of reality.

"I am a co-constructivist, which means I think we construct our perception of the world,  but with the help of the world itself, which...lends us a hand....Mind and world are inseparable" (Morin, 2002, pp.332-333).

Morin (2002) starts with an approach similar to Maturana before adding that the world assists with the task of perceiving the world around us. In the quote, the “lends us a hand” component may be interpreted as indicating there are already entities in the world that can be distinguished in unique ways. For example, the combined group in the last part of the above pre-existed any individual's activity but could still be distinguished as the marked state as a complex system like in Spencer-Brown's (1994) work. A Morin-based approach bypasses the more primordial step suggested by Maturana's work of an individual first finding themselves in a place where entities do not exist (this takes significant consideration to get through). Then, they are brought into existence (bringing forth) through operations of distinction, followed by a background the distinguished makes sense within and is then meaningfully interacted with through operational conditions (Maturana, 2005).

Complex systems exist in the world as we distinguish them, give them a background in which they make sense, and bring forth their "complexityness" through operational conditions (Maturana, 2005). The approach to complex systems existing in the world does not discount the capacity of complex systems to have cognitive and emotional effects on those who observe and interact with them, including managers, the individuals inside the system, and involved stakeholders. However, this approach does take the definitive stance that these effects are not the source of complexity but a reaction to it. Acknowledging the capacity of complex systems and how they are found in the world and may or may not have emerged through the initial conditions of constraints set by the behavior and communications of managers is a powerful realization. Recognizing complex systems as having status in the world opens new possibilities for perceiving, learning about, and addressing emergency operations and broader emergency management functions.

If you have read this far, perhaps you will be willing to read a little more. Complex systems are not an academic hallucination. Dr. Louise Comfort’s work on the Northridge Earthquake dismisses that notion. Your high school friends were a complex system; that party you threw while your parents were out of town was a complex system; your friend group(s) in college were complex systems, as was the house or dorm you lived in, as are the friends you have now. The woods or desert you hike in contains ecosystem(s), which are complex systems. The Emergency Operations Center you work in might be a complex system if it is not over-constrained to the point where it is an ordered system and loses its life-like qualities. Complex systems can emerge conditionally out of the context they find themselves in or through the establishment of different types of constraints established by managers like the task force. Even then, there is no guarantee one will emerge as it is dependent on many factors, including the individuals. In emergency management and public safety at large, there may be resistance to these ideas. For example, when they unknowingly distinguished a complex system, the division supervisor’s early reaction was perceived as a deviation from the norm and a mutation to be cut out, a reaction that may be widespread. As the talk of complex systems in emergency management continues to increase, reception to these ideas may someday follow.

References

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